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The dream of reason did not take power into account.'
Since the judicial retreat in the face of the New Deal revolution, consti-
tutional scholars have generally viewed the "counter-majoritarian diffi-
culty" as the central dilemma of constitutional theory.' The academic re-
sponse to this normative challenge has varied widely, with some scholars
virtually raising the flag of judicial surrender,3 others discovering judicial
authority in perfecting legislative democracy, 4 and still others recognizing
a democratic legitimacy in the judiciary itself.5
"Modern civic republicanism" approaches questions of judicial review
from a different perspective. Rather than urging the courts to further pure
democratic rule, which is criticized for its lack of intellectual coherence
and normative appeal, modern civic republicans articulate an alternative
vision of public decisionmaking-a model of policymaking in which deci-
sions are made in the legislative process through principled deliberation
and reasoned dialogue. Regardless of one's views on these issues, the im-
portance of this alternative perspective, and Cass Sunstein's powerful con-
tributions to it, cannot be denied. By sketching a full vision of legislative
decisionmaking through reasoned deliberation, civic republicanism seeks
to redirect the focus of constitutional theory itself. This vision, moreover,
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strikes a responsive cord in many lawyers and legal academics, myself
very much included, in part because it replicates some of the aspirational
features of the adjudicative process itself-"neutral" decisionmaking,
principled deliberation, and dialogue.
In this symposium and elsewhere, the "republican revival" is being de-
bated on a variety of theoretical grounds: whether it sufficiently protects
those "natural rights" implicit in liberal theory; whether reasoned deliber-
ation will lead to objectively agreed upon values; and whether the particu-
lar vision articulated by modern civic republicans finds support in Ameri-
can or constitutional history. This essay focuses on a somewhat more
practical issue: whether, given the state of twentieth-century American po-
litical institutions, the republican ideal of deliberative decisionmaking may
be in tension with other republican goals, such as equality, participation,
reflective innovation, and universalism. Ironically, the academic literature
on political parties suggests that the general approach outlined by Sun-
stein (and others) for promoting reasoned dialogue in our political institu-
tions may have the potential for undermining public political participa-
tion, especially among poorer groups; increasing irrationality in public
programs; and protecting the status quo. Indeed, institutional changes in
Congress over the last thirty years, which provide a useful case study of
some elements of the civic virtue strategy, support this prediction. To the
degree that this is true, the civic republican pursuit of rational dialogue
may be attractive, but of uncertain value in furthering these other republi-
can goals.
I. THE Civic REPUBLICAN PHILOSOPHY
Civic republican writers are faced with a fundamental dilemma. As
most lawyers recognize, political institutions are populated with many pri-
vate regarding representatives, lobbied by narrow self-interested organiza-
tions, and elected by many citizens concerned primarily with their per-
sonal welfare.6 In light of this political and social culture, the question
then becomes how a system can be structured so as to stimulate reasoned
dialogue-the linchpin of the civic republican's pursuit of universalism,
participation, reflective innovation, and equality? In the absence of a real
world decisionmaking device analogous to a Rawlsian veil of ignorance,
6. A rich literature has detailed the effectiveness of various interest groups in influencing legisla-
tive behavior. See Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3, 3
(1971); Peltzman, Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting, 27 J.L. & EcoN. 181, 210 (1984);
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 213 (1976); Posner,
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335, 335-36 (1974).
More recently, however, a variety of scholars have questioned the pervasiveness of this phenome-
non, documenting numerous instances of so-called public-regarding activity by legislative actors. See,
e.g., M. DERTHWICK & P. QUIRK, THE POuTICS OF DEREGULATION 252-58 (1985); D. ROBYN,
BRAKING THE SPECIAL INTERESTS 1-11 (1987); S. KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY 231-47
(1987); A. MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD, 3-31 (1983).
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Sunstein discusses several doctrines which he believes will promote mod-
ern civic republicanism.' A brief review of a few of these devices is helpful
in illuminating what I understand to be the underlying theory behind this
approach.
A. Civic Republican Constitutional Doctrines
In general, the most important structural goal appears to be political
insulation: "Madisonian republicanism calls for substantial autonomy on
the part of representatives."' As noted here and in Sunstein's earlier Stan-
ford article, representatives' relative insulation from "pressure" by their
constituents helps free them to deliberate in the public interest., The ap-
parent assumption is that "the people" are less likely to possess virtue
than their representatives; unreflective representation of popular will and
interests would thus be unlikely to further a deliberative democracy. At
the creation of the republic, various structural devices, such as representa-
tive democracy itself and indirect election of the Senate and President,
helped to further this goal. ° While it is unclear what further structural
changes, sponsored by the court or constitutional amendment, would be
offered by modern civic republicans to protect or extend this original con-
ception, civic republicanism appears to be sympathetic to this type of
approach.1
One device which Sunstein does discuss here for enhancing indepen-
dence and stimulating dialogue is strengthened judicial review of legisla-
tive deliberations, which hopefully would help ensure that legislators do
not reflexively follow their constituents' or lobbyists' interests, and conse-
quently that a full debate occurs. 2 While heightened judicial reyiew of
the legislative process, like the hard look doctrine from which it derives
historical and intellectual support,'13 is unlikely to excise self-interest from
legislative motivations, the presumption appears to be that such review
7. I review these techniques not to debate the nuances of the legal standards-which I presume
will undergo further development as civic republicans continue to explore "institutional arrangements
and doctrinal shifts . . . that might serve to implement the most attractive features of the republican
vision," Sunstein, Beyond The Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541 (1988)-but to illumi-
nate what I take to be the underlying theory and approach for furthering this dialogic vision.
8. Id. at 1560.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1560-61.
11. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx L. REV. 873, 912
n.224 (1987); Elliot, Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1104-10
(arguing for reforms to the structure of Congress such as a twelve year term without the possibility of
reelection.).
12. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1579.
13. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48 (1983).
For favorable analyses of these efforts, see, e.g., Bruff, Legislative Formality and Administrative
Rationality, 63 TEx. L. REV. 207, 237-40 (1984); Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard Look Doc-
trine, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 177, 179, 181-84, 206-13.
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would create added incentives for legislators to engage in principled
deliberations.
Of course, the extent and nature of this dialogical mandate is somewhat
unclear. Legislators and legislative bodies act for a variety of motivations
and reasons. Presumably, however, some reasonable number of members
would need to have engaged in a rational debate to satisfy the deliberative
ideal. Dialogue presumes that there is an exchange of views, an obligation
by decisionmakers to explain decisions and answer the criticisms by chal-
lengers. 4 As Sunstein explains, republican theories "require public re-
garding justifications offered after multiple points of view have been con-
sulted and (to the extent possible) genuinely understood."' 5 In order to
stimulate such exchanges, judicial review would need to be greatly
strengthened. 6
Another method Sunstein advocates for promoting the dialogic ideal is
proportional representation of different groups' interests within the legis-
lative body. Sunstein describes this requirement as a second best solution
to the difficulties in creating a true Madisonian dialogue among legislators
who often will be psychologically bound by their homogenous life exper-
iences. 1 Proportional representation helps ensure that a rich diversity of
viewpoints will be heard and considered.'"
Taken together, the discussions of proportional representation, insula-
tion, and enhanced judicial review all reflect what I take to be the basic
civic republican philosophy for promoting public regarding dialogue
among political actors. The underlying goal of civic republicans, as articu-
lated by Sunstein, is to create a diverse government of relatively "insu-
lated" and "autonomous" political actors. Checks and balances, federal-
ism, and bicameralism are more familiar constitutional elements of this
general principle-that by placing authority in the hands of independent
actors and institutions, each participant will be forced to understand and
14. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 4 (1980) (in "Neutral"
dialogue, "[w]henever anybody questions the legitimacy of another's power, the power holder must
respond not by suppressing the questioner, but by giving a reason that explains why he is more
entitled to the resource than the questioner is"); Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword:
The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (1979) (in judicial dialogue, judges are obligated to
listen and respond).
15. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1575.
16. Sunstein does not specifically advocate a constitutional requirement of legislative due process,
although that presumably would help ensure that "multiple perspectives" are presented during legis-
lative deliberations. Indeed, a legislative body subject to judicial review of its motivational goals might
well choose to supplement legislative procedures as a means of discharging this constitutional require-
ment. For a discussion of this issue, see Farber & Frickey, supra note 11, at 920-24; Linde, Due
Process of Lawmaking, 55 NE. L. REV. 197, 235-55 (1976).
17. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1588.
18. As Sunstein acknowledges, proportional representation appears to reduce insulation of politi-
cal actors. To this extent, it might work at cross purposes with the goal of political insulation, see
Comment, Politics and Purpose: Hide and Seek in the Gerrymandering Thicket after Davis v.
Bandemer, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 183, 213 (1987), although it would serve to increase the diversity of
any dialogue or debate that ultimately ensued.
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deliberate with others in order to secure government action, thereby pro-
moting reasoned dialogue. As Hamilton observed: "The oftener [a law] is
brought under examination [and] the greater the diversity in the situations
of those who are to examine it, the less must be the danger of those errors
which flow from want of due deliberation, or of those missteps which
proceed from the contagion of some common passion or interest."19 Sun-
stein echoes this view: "[T]he systems of checks and balances, bicamera-
lism, and federalism responded to the central republican understanding
that disagreement can be a creative force," an "indispensable part of the
basic republican faith in political dialogue."2
B. The Value of Dialogue in Furthering Other Social Goals
Although valued as an end in itself, the resulting deliberative dialogue
is also associated with other beneficial effects. Since every major viewpoint
will be assured "a piece of the action," political participation and social
equality should be furthered. At the same time, the normative and ra-
tional failings of pluralism-its supposed bias toward elite and wealthier
groups and against diffuse interests-may be overcome, or at least re-
duced, through rational deliberation. Moreover, because a true dialogue
presumes that arguments will be listened to and answered, there is less
likely to be a bias towards the status quo: every program is open to chal-
lenge and rational debate, and perhaps reformulation.21 Thus, rational
dialogue is supposed to lead to, or be associated with, greater equality,
participation, innovation, and universality.
II. THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE Civic REPUBLICAN REFORMS
A. Civic Republicanism and Division of Power
In evaluating these arguments, it is important to recognize at the outset
that the likely result (if not goal) of the republican approach is a disper-
sion of power within the political process. As a theoretical matter, rational
dialogue, if it is to be taken seriously, inherently presumes an equalization
of influence, especially as compared to a centralized structure of a strong
president or party leaders. Ideally, each political actor is to be engaged,
consulted and understood, that is, treated as an end. He cannot be ignored
or merely directed to adhere to a party line in return for party favors or
out of concern for central party discipline.22
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 443 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
20. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1562, 1575.
21. Id. at 1557, 1566-71, 1581.
22. This phenomenon seems implicit in Sunstein's description of rational dialogue, in which mul-
tiple points of view must be "consulted" and "understood". Other descriptions of rational dialogue by
legal scholars seem consistent with this perspective. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 4 (1980)
(rational dialogue requires that political actors engage in a conversation); Fiss, supra note 14, at 13
(judicial dialogue requires that all arguments be answered); Mashaw, Administrative Due Process:
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As a practical matter, moreover, political actors who are "autonomous"
and "insulated" from constituent pressures (a primary goal of civic repub-
licanism) will indeed be more independent politically-free to defy and
challenge party or national leaders who cannot hold them accountable
through resort to popular pressure. Historically, party leaders and presi-
dents have been able to secure cooperation from congressmen by virtue of
their ability to replace recalcitrant politicians at re-election time, their
power to withhold party campaign funding, patronage, and support, and
the knowledge of congressmen or political supportors that their electoral
fate is tied to the political and administrative success of the general party
or president.23 In contrast, civic republicanism ultimately relies on a
leader's ability to secure cooperation through dialogue.
Finally, the stated purpose of proportional representation, one of Sun-
stein's specific recommendations, is to disperse authority directly by giving
each group "a piece of the action." Sunstein describes the goal of this and
other civic republican proposals as "multiplying the points of access to
goverment" and "generat[ing] institutions that will produce deliberation
among those differently situated." This dispersion, it is hoped, serves to
ensure a rich diversity of viewpoints in government, and thus a full and
developed rational dialogue.24
B. Political Party Perspective
Unfortunately, there is a serious cost to the republican approach, a cost
which can be illustrated by contrasting it with the more traditional politi-
cal science reaction to some of the same concerns of inequality, declining
political participation, bias towards the status quo, and special interest
group influence. This political science solution, which has the "strong[]
support" of "a large majority of mainstream political scientists in the
field," is not pluralism, but strong political parties.25 As I have argued in
greater detail elsewhere,26 and summarize only briefly here, political par-
ties serve to centralize authority, creating large scale institutions that at-
The Quest For a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REV. 885, 899-901 (1981); Michelman, The Supreme
Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 33 (1986).
23. See, e.g., M. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 209 (1981); Fer-
ejohn & Fiorina, Incumbency and Realignment in Congressional Elections, in THE NEW DIREC-
TIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 91, 93 (U. Chubb & P. Peterson eds. 1985).
24. See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1585-89. To be sure, on one level, the use of courts to engineer
these reforms might be viewed as centralizing power in that branch, at least over the short run. In
addition, Sunstein's proposals on statutory construction, which often envision the courts independently
imposing their own deliberative judgments, have no direct effect on dispersion within the political
branches. See Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the
Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1591-92 n.77 (1988) (discussing court centered ap-
proaches to civic virtue). As I understand it, however, the underlying theory behind the civic republi-
can approach to reform of the political branches favors a dispersion of influence among political actors
as a means of stimulating dialogue.
25. L. SABATO, THE PARTY'S JUST BEGUN 2 (1988).
26. See Fitts, supra note 24.
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tract diffuse majority support and overcome some of the collective action
problems in popular political organization as well as government adminis-
tration. The result is the "generation of countervailing collective power on
behalf of the many who are individually powerless against the relatively
few who are individually-or organizationally-powerful.""7
The way political parties achieve these goals, however, is very different
from the civic republican approach. According to the political science liter-
ature, insulation of individual government actors and dispersion of govern-
ment power is a serious problem in government, both as an impediment to
effective and coordinated action and as a system that facilitates the influ-
ence and power of concentrated and wealthier special interest groups. Po-
litical parties, which seek to overcome those discrete sources of influence,
are thus "the special form of political organization adapted to the mobili-
zation of the majority."2
Not surprisingly, the political party literature views political dialogue
and ideological politics, especially in the extreme, more skeptically. Ac-
cording to Sunstein, modern civic republicanism envisions rational dia-
logue as a "Rawlsian ideal"-by leading participants to "think from the
point of view of everyone," a type of consensus is often achieved.2" Much
of the political science literature suggests, however, that ideological de-
bate-discussing public problems in terms of fundamental questions and
beliefs-can sometimes create and exacerbate divisions and disputes in a
public political context.30 Deep moral discussion can thus undermine the
ability to reach consensus, and take action.
Many political scientists also point out, on the other hand, that particu-
laristic incentives and pragmatic political coalitions-the antithesis of ide-
ological debate-can foster beneficial public policy. Patronage, as well as
other particularistic devices, can be powerful tools for mobilizing support
and centralizing political authority across dispersed political institutions,
thereby enhancing majority rule and the effectiveness and consistency of
administration. In general, party compromise, although unable to invoke
the lofty principles of reasoned discourse, frequently allows deals to be
27. W. BURNHAM, CRITICAL LE'rIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 133
(1970).
28. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 208 (1942); see also A. RANNEY, THE DOC-
TRINE OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT 11 (1962); E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVER-
IGN PEOPLE 78-96 (1960).
29. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1554-55.
30. See Orren, The Changing Styles of American Party Politics, in THE FtrrmE OF AMERICAN
POLITICAL PARTIES 25, 30 (J. Fleishman ed. 1982); J. WILSON, THE AMATEUR DEMOCRAT: CLUB
POLITICS IN THREE CITIES 358 (1962); A. WILDAVSKY, The Goldwater Phenomenon: Purists, Poli-
ticians, and the Two Party System, in THE REVOLT AGAINST THE MASSES 246, 257-69 (1971). As
Stephen Holmes writes: "In a liberal social order, the basic narrative framework must be able to
command the loyalty of individuals and groups with widely differing self-understandings and concep-
tions of personal fulfillment. As a result, theorists of justice can achieve their principal aim only by
steering clear of irresolvable metaphysical disputes." Holmes, Gag Rules or The Politics of Omission,
in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (3. Elster & R. Slagstad eds. 1988).
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reached-"giving to each group some but never all of what it wants."
31
While constitutional decisions and popular attitudes have reduced the ex-
tent of this activity, especially at the federal level, self-interest politics and
party campaign funding remain important devices at times for enabling
political leaders to mobilize the public, centralize authority, and coordi-
nate action. 2
C. The Civic Republican Reforms
In light of this more sympathic view towards the value of centralization
and particularistic incentives, what is the likely result of the civic republi-
can approach in terms of the social ideals Sunstein sets forth-namely,
greater innovation, universalism, participation, and equality? I am some-
what pessimistic.
First, many of the changes Sunstein discusses may well serve to protect
the status quo. As he recognizes, some of the proposals would create im-
pediments to government taking action-in the public choice vernacular,
collective action problems. Proportional representation, insulation of indi-
vidual legislators, and supplementation of checks and balances are in-
tended not only to offer each group a foothold, but if rational dialogue is
to be taken seriously, a foothold with influence. In purpose and effect,
these reforms, especially proportional representation and public funding of
political campaigns, tend to accelerate the decline of political parties as
centralizing institutions, increasing the dispersal of authority, both within
Congress and between Congress and other institutions.3  As a result, there
might well be a corresponding decline in the ability of government to act
consistently and expeditiously, leading to greater political gridlock.
To a proponent of civic virtue, this insulation of decisionmakers and
dispersal of authority create a fundamental problem: They bias the politi-
cal system in favor of the status quo, or at least in favor of private market
solutions to social problems. Although Madison himself might expect and
welcome this result-that was one original rationale for checks and bal-
31. A. RANNEY & W. KENDALL, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM 508 (1956).
32. Indeed, paradoxically, pork barrel politics-the antithesis of civic republicanism-also can be
an important device (perhaps the most important device) for offering legislators the independence civic
republicanism presumes. Historically, legislators' ability to bring home local projects and perform
constituency services has permitted them to perform legislative activities free of constituent control.
Pork barrel politics can thus help solve one of the dilemmas of civic republicanism-how to secure for
representatives the independence to engage in reasoned dialogue when they are faced with a citizenry
animated by self-interest. See Fitts, supra note 24, at 1632-33.
33. For a discussion of the decline of political parties, and its consequences, see W. CROTrY,
AMERICAN PARTIES IN DECLINE 275-79 (1984); N. NIE, S. VERSA & J. PETROCIK, THE CHANG-
ING AMERICAN VOTER 73 (1979); D. PRICE, BRINGING BACK THE PARTIES 105-07 (1984); Burn-
ham, American Politics in the 1970's: Beyond Party?, in AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS: STAGES OF
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 308, 340 (W. Chambers & W. Burnham eds. 2d ed. 1975). Of course,
public funding of campaigns through centralized parties would not be inconsistent with a political
party approach.
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ances throughout our political systems 4 -it appears in tension with the
modern civic republican rejection of status quo baselines.
Indeed, recent trends in Congress over the last 30 years, during which
time control of central party leaders has become more dissipated and indi-
vidual congressmen far more autonomous and insulated, provide a useful
case study of the civic virtue approach. As a result of reduced party identi-
fication within the electorate as well as increased constituency servicing
and distributive legislation, congressmen now have far greater indepen-
dence from the President, party leaders, and chamber officials. In the pre-
sent decentralized congressional environment, which civic republicanism
presumably would applaud and seek to accelerate, more groups have been
able to find representational expression within the power structure, and
ideological political debate also has increased-as civic republicans theory
would hope and predict.3 5 On the other hand, there have been serious
difficulties with this dispersion, which has accompanied the decline of
parties in Congress and across government generally. As the political
party scholars predicted, Congress's ability to undertake coordinated ac-
tion has seriously diminished, frequently leading to political stalemate."8
A second related difficulty with the civic republican approach is that
the dispersion of political authority may enhance the influence of special
interest groups, thereby undermining the consistency and rationality of
our overall legislative product, as well as its democratic legitimacy. A sys-
tem that seeks to or has the consequences of severely dividing power-by
promoting proportional representation and political autonomy-is likely
to undermine those institutions that tend to support majority rule, and
expand the influence of narrow groups to assert their influence. Once
again, the historical literature on Congress is instructive. The dispersal of
authority in Congress over the last thirty years, as innumerable scholars
have demonstrated, has had a profound impact on the influence of narrow
specialized constituencies, which are able to obtain a legislative foothold
and trade that position for legislative influence. One result is a propensity
toward budget deficits and legislation that often serves a variety of incon-
sistent objectives.
3 7
34. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82-84 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); THE
FEDERALIST No. 73, at 443-44 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also Easterbrook, Statutes'
Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 549-50 (1983).
35. See M. DERTHIcK & P. QUIRK, supra note 6, at 252-58; Wilson, The Politics of Regulation,
in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 370-72 (J. Wilson ed. 1980); Sinclair, Building Coalitions
in Congress, in THE NEW CONGRESS 178, 217-20 (T. Mann & N. Ornstein eds. 1981).
36. See e.g., B. CAIN, J. FEREJOHN & M. FIORINA, THE PERSONAL VOTE 14, 21 (1987); L.
DODD & R. SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1979); M. FIORINA, CON-
GRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 66, 73 (1977); L. REISELBACH, CON-
GRESSIONAL REFORM 88-89 (1986); D. VOGEL & S. WALDMAN, CONGRESS AND DEMOCRACY
91-97 (1985).
37. See e.g., B. CAIN, J. FEREJOHN & M. FIORINA, supra note 36, at 21; Cogan, The Evolution
of Congressional Budget Decisionmaking and the Emergence of Federal Deficits (Standford Working
Paper No. P-88-6, 1988); Inman, Federal Assistance and Local Services in the United States: The
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Of course, to the degree that a rich civic republican debate actually
ensues, this concern could be somewhat minimized. Groups would some-
times be able to gain influence by the power of their ideas, not their mem-
bers' organizational influence. Moreover, although the influence of special
interest groups may undermine majority rule, there is some question, ac-
cording to civic republican theory, whether pure democratic rule is itself a
coherent or legitimate organizing principle for public decisionmaking.
As the history of the last thirty years suggests, however, it is difficult to
believe that a diverse organization such as the United States Congress
would be able to achieve a civic republican concensus very often. More
importantly, our constitutional system, as Sunstein recognizes, does not
adopt any singular approach; majoritarian democratic principles continue
to retain a firm hold on constitutional doctrine and academic theory. In-
deed, a concern with the counter-majoritarian aspects of interest group
pluralism-the disproportionate advantage of narrow self-interested
groups-fuels part of the civic republican critique. 8 Civic republicanism
is supposed to ensure that the legitimate objectives of all the public are
furthered. To the extent that civic republicanism increases the organiza-
tional advantages of narrow constituancies, therefore, it may be subject to
the same criticisms it has raised against pluralism.
A final concern with modern civic republicanism-one I find perhaps
most troubling-is its possible effect on social equality and political par-
ticipation. As Sunstein discusses, once civic republicanism focused on fur-
thering its principles in a national government, as distinguished from ho-
mogeneous local communities, the problem of creating a governing body
infused with republican ideals became exacerbated.39 The Madisonian so-
lution, which Sunstein apparently wishes to endorse, is to increase the
separation of the elected from the governed and hope to induce a public
regarding ideological dialogue among government actors through judicial
review and multiplying the points of access of different groups and inter-
ests to government.
Unfortunately, the likely effect of this civic republican strategy upon a
mass public that still influences policy through democratic election may be
counterproductive. In many cases, large segments of the general popula-
tion, disproportionately drawn from the poor and undereducated, are less
able to understand, evaluate, or participate in such elite debates. In other
words, "the generally held belief among elites that the public understands
political abstractions is an optical illusion, generated by the fact that the
elite stratum is consumed in political conversation with itself, and only
Evolution of a New Federal Fiscal Order, in FISCAL FEDERALISM AND QUANTATIVE SruDIEs (H.
Rosen ed. 1988).
38. See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1545-46; see also Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Pub-
lic Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
39. See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1556.
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rarely has occasion to discuss politics with the apolitical man citizenry."4
As a result, "an issue-oriented electorate is one likely to increase the influ-
ence of the better educated and upper income groups over electoral
decisions."
4'
In addition, the dispersion of political authority implicit in this ap-
proach can also increase voter confusion over the responsibility of different
representatives for government actions. With multiple decisionmakers and
group dialogues, it becomes extremely difficult for voters to understand
which political officials are responsible for government programs, and to
hold them accountable. Is a President, a party leader, a committee chair, a
coalition leader, or simply an individual representative, answerable for
government action or inaction in a system with "multiple points of access"
and rational dialogue? Though special interest group representatives will
probably be able to answer that question, the general public will probably
not.
Indeed, one prominent political scientist has suggested that the decline
of parties and rise of dispersed ideological politics over the past few years
explains the low level of political participation and voting in the United
States today, especially among the poor, and indirectly the election by a
minority of eligible voters of Ronald Reagan.42 If this perspective is taken
seriously, the ultimate result of an even more ideological and dispersed
debate could well be a more apathetic and alienated public. Rational dia-
logue and participation would only be an elite phenomenon.
All this is surely not to deny the substantial and insightful contributions
Sunstein makes to thinking about these issues. In light of the now recog-
nized weaknesses in democratic theory-both normative and ra-
tional-civic republicanism offers an alternative vision of reasoned delib-
eration that correctly accounts for much of our existing legal structure and
maps out various fruitful avenues for potential reform. Clearly, party rule
is not the total answer; our political system embodies both democratic and
republican principles.
At the same time, modern civic republicanism, at least in my view, has
not solved the problems associated with self-interested actors in govern-
ment.43 Even though insulation and multiplying points of access may in-
crease dialogue, in many cases they may also confuse the public, exacer-
bate divisions, reduce popular political control among the poor, and create
40. W. NEUMANN, THE PARADOX OF MASS POLITICS: KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION IN THE
AMERICAN ELECTORATE 22 (1986).
41. W. CROTTY, supra note 33, at 276-79; see also Burnham, The Turnout Problem, in ELEC-
TIONS AMERICAN STYLE 97, 132 (A. Reichley ed. 1987); W. BURNHAM, The Appearance and Dis-
appearance of the American Voter, in THE CURREr CRISIS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 121, 196
(1986).
42. See Burnham, supra note 41, at 131.
43. For some of my own speculations on possible approaches, see Fitts, supra note 24, at
1644-45. See also Fitts, Ignorance Can Be Bliss: Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence in
Administrative and Legislative Decisionmaking (working paper).
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a structural bias in favor of the status quo. Rational dialogue is an admi-
rable goal. I wish I could be sure that it will not be pursued at the ex-
pense of political equality, participation, and innovation.
